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Abstract 
We examine the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of German 
companies reporting under IAS during 2000-2002 (IAS period), and IFRS during 2003-
2004 (IFRSvoluntary period) and 2005-2006 (IFRSmandatory period). We find a decrease in 
accounting quality after the mandatory EU adoption in 2005. Our findings on earnings 
smoothing and timely loss recognition corroborates largely our findings related to value 
relevance of accounting information. Our results indicate that accounting quality has not 
improved but worsened over time. Further analysis shows that this development is less 
likely be driven by new adopters of IFRS but is driven by the changes of the standards. 
Contrary to the intention with the adoption of the European adoption of IFRS, this makes 
it harder for investors to base their decisions on the IFRS financial reporting.  
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I. Introduction 
The main objective of this study is to examine and compare the quality of 
accounting numbers under International Accounting Standards (IAS) during 2000-2002 
with those under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) during 2003-20063.  
Accordingly, we compare the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of 
German companies reporting under IAS during 2000-2002 (IAS period), and IFRS during 
2003-2004 (IFRSvoluntary period) and 2005-2006 (IFRSmandatory period).  Specifically, we 
investigate whether there is a change in accounting quality during these three time 
periods.  We limit our investigation to German companies to hold constant certain 
institutional factors such as stock listing requirements, accounting disclosure 
requirements, market microstructures and regulatory environments that may confound the 
results, thereby strengthening the reliability of our findings. 
Our inquiry is mainly motivated by the major revisions of IASs and the 
development of new IFRSs since the implementation of the new structure with IASB 
taking over the standard setting responsibilities from IASC in April 2001.  The IASB has 
focused on developing a set of high quality standards to promote global accounting 
harmonization.  This has led to significant changes in standards; only 31 of the 41 IASs 
remained in effect as of January 2005.  In addition, by this time, IASB has issued eight 
new IFRSs (IASB).  Many of these revisions and new additions of accounting standards 
reflect IASB’s preference for fair value measurement of assets and liabilities (Alexander 
and Jermakowicz 2006; Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Schipper 2005; Whittington 
2005).  Considering the developments in the international standards, we predict that these 
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 Beginning in 2005, all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS.  Prior to that, using IAS/IFRS was voluntary in 
many European countries.      
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changes are likely to affect the quality of accounting amounts as a result of IASB’s 
increased orientation towards fair value accounting.   
The European Union’s (EU) adoption has made IFRS the most widely accepted 
financial accounting model in the world.  It is very important that current and potential 
investors as well as the standard setters understand the implication of IFRS on accounting 
variables.  Hence, we also examine the effect of the EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
2005 and 2006 on the quality of accounting.  Specifically, we examine whether the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU may have changed the structure of the set of 
companies reporting under IFRS and how this may have impacted the overall accounting 
quality. 
Prior research has compared properties of accounting numbers using samples of 
German companies (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Bartov and Kim 2005; Barth et 
al. 2008, Barth et al. 2006).  Our study differs from prior research on quality of IAS and 
IFRS accounting measures in that we examine the change in quality of accounting caused 
by the revisions made to IASs and the development of new IFRSs.  This study compares 
the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of German companies reporting 
under IAS during 2000-2002, and IFRS during 2003-2004 and 2005-2006.  Specifically, 
we investigate whether there is a change in accounting quality during these three time 
periods as IASB revises existing IAS and issues new IFRS to formulate a set of high 
quality international accounting standards for global financial reporting purpose.  
Contrary to our expectations, our results suggest a decrease in accounting quality after the 
mandatory EU adoption of IFRS. We find that earnings and book value of equity are 
becoming less value relevant during the IFRS periods compared to the IAS period. Our 
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findings on earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition largely corroborates our 
findings with respect to the value relevance of accounting information. Our results 
indicate that accounting quality has not improved but worsened over time. Further 
analysis shows that this is less likely to be driven by new adopters of IFRS in 2005 and 
more by the change in international accounting standards. When using a matched sample 
we cannot find any clear indication of either an improved or a worsened quality of 
financial reporting. We also analyzed the voluntary and the mandatory adopters in the 
period 2005 to 2006. We found only weak indications that the decrease in quality was 
caused by the mandatory adopters. Furthermore, we also investigated whether our results 
were driven by a new dominating industry group, Financials. We find nothing supporting 
that this is the case and our interpretation is that the decrease in accounting quality is 
driven by the revisions of IASs and the addition of new of IFRSs around the time of the 
European mandatory adoption. Contrary to the intention with the European adoption of 
IFRS, this might make it harder for investors to base their decisions on the accounting 
information.  
Our primary contribution is that we exclusively examine the impact of 
international standards over time on accounting quality and value relevance of accounting 
measures as these standards go through revisions and new standards are issued.  No 
study, to our knowledge, has empirically examined this issue. Our second contribution is 
that we include more recent data and investigate the effects of the mandatory EU 
adoption of IFRS since 2005 on accounting quality.   
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes 
the development of international accounting standards over time. Section III briefly 
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discusses prior research and develops hypotheses.  Section IV discusses the research 
design and how we examine earnings smoothing, timely loss recognition and value 
relevance over time.  Section V describes the sample, and the sample selection criteria.  
Section VI presents our findings while Section VII concludes. 
II. The Development of International Accounting Standards over Time 
During the period of our investigation, a number of revisions to International 
Accounting Standards took place.  These changes are summarized in Table 1, which 
outlines the revisions of existing IASs and the issuance of new IFRSs in the 
chronological order these changes went into effect.  Of these changes, we consider three 
to have had a major impact on companies’ financial reporting and thereby the possibility 
of a major impact on the value relevance on book value of equity and earnings.  Theses 
changes are related to IAS 36, Impairment of assets, IAS 38, Intangible assets, and IFRS 
3, Business combinations.  IAS 36 requires a review of assets including intangible assets 
with an indefinite useful life for impairment, and measurement of recoverable amounts 
on an annual basis.  Any impairment loss is recorded as an expense in the income 
statement.  IAS 38 requires the recognition of an intangible asset when it is probable that 
future benefits of an intangible asset will benefit the company, and the cost of the 
intangible asset can be measured reliably.  In addition, intangible assets should also be 
assessed for impairment in accordance with IAS 36.  IFRS 3 allows only the purchase 
method for business combinations.  All identifiable assets and liabilities are valued at fair 
value.  Goodwill is not amortized, but subject to an impairment test annually.  Negative 
goodwill is recognized immediately in the income statement.  Since the changes in these 
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accounting standards are all fair-value oriented, we expect the informativeness of IFRS 
earnings and book values to increase compared to that of IAS earnings and book values.   
<Table 1 about here> 
II. Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
As noted earlier, some recent studies compare IAS accounting measures to those 
under other GAAPs.  Hung and Subramanyam (2007) compare the financial statement 
effects of using IAS to those using German GAAP for a sample of German companies 
that elected to adopt IAS by examining these companies’ restatements of prior years 
accounting numbers in the adoption year.  They find that the adjustments between the 
two reporting systems are value relevant for book values of equity, but not for earnings. 
But they do not find any difference in value relevance of book value of equity and 
earnings under IAS and German GAAP.  They also find that total assets and book value 
of equity are significantly higher under IAS and that there is a higher variability in book 
value of equity and earnings under IAS.  Finally, they find that IAS adopters exhibit 
larger loss provisions.  Bartov et al. (2005) also examine and compare the value relevance 
of earnings based US GAAP, IAS and German GAAP.  They, on the other hand, find that 
IAS earnings are more value relevant than those based on German GAAP.  The 
difference in the results of these two studies may be found in that Bartov et al. (2005) 
exclude loss-firm observations in their estimations while these are included in the Hung 
Subramanyam (2007) study.  
Jermakowicz et al. (2007) examine German companies’ adoption of IFRS and US 
GAAP over the period 1995 to 2004. Specifically, they investigate the usefulness, 
proxied as value relevance, before and after the adoption of these GAAPs and the 
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perceived benefits and costs related to the process of implementing IFRS among the 
DAX-30 companies.4 They find a significant increase in the value relevance of earnings 
after the adoption of these GAAPs. They also find that the key challenges related to the 
adoption of IFRS are the complexity of IFRS, the costs involved, and the lack of 
implementation guidance. The challenges related to the adoption of IFRS documented by 
Jermakowicz et al. (2007) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007) may explain the findings of 
Christensen et al. (2007). Christensen et al. (2007) investigate the change in earnings 
management and timely loss recognition among German firms that voluntarily adopt 
IFRS and those who wait until the adoption of IFRS is mandatory. They find that 
companies that voluntarily adopt are less prone to earnings management and recognize 
losses more timely compared to those that resist and wait until the adoption of IFRS 
becomes mandatory. They interpret their findings as a sign of how certain companies (i.e. 
insider oriented companies) have less incentive to adopt IFRS since they will not benefit 
and the challenges involved are considerable.  
Finally, Barth et al. (2008) also study IAS adopters from a number of countries, 
whereof Germany is one of the countries with greatest representation in the sample.  
They find that firms that adopt IAS are less prone to engage in earnings smoothing and 
recognize losses more timely.  
There are also other recent studies on the effect of German and other GAAPs’ on 
accounting quality and cost of capital.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) investigate the bid-
ask spreads, trading volume, and stock return volatility as proxies for the information 
asymmetry part of cost of capital.  Comparing the above proxies for German companies 
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 DAX-30 (Deutscher Aktien IndeX 30 (formerly Deutscher Aktien-Index-30) is a Blue Chip stock market 
index consisting of the 30 major German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.  
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which switch from German GAAP to either IAS or US GAAP, as they predict, they find 
that the bid-asked spread decreases, and the trading volume increases, however they find 
no reduction in stock return volatility.  Daske (2006) builds on Leuz and Verrecchia’s 
(2000) study using data from 1993 and 2002.  He, on the other hand, does not find any 
sign of a lower cost of capital for companies that switch to IAS or US GAAP.  On the 
contrary, Daske (2006) finds an increase in cost of capital for these companies.  Finally, 
Platikanova and Nobes (2006) compare the information asymmetry component of the 
bid-ask spread among companies before and after EU’s adoption of IFRS in 2005.  They 
find a larger volatility in the information asymmetry for UK and German companies.  
Contrary to expectations, they also find that companies from countries where earnings 
management is more common exhibit a lower information asymmetry component 
compared to other groups of countries.  They interpret this result as income smoothing 
reduces information asymmetry.  
Overall, the results of these studies do not provide clear evidence on how the 
recent development in the global accounting standards impacts the quality of the 
accounting amounts.  For instance, Barth et al. (2008) and Jermakowicz et al. (2007) 
cover a period including both IAS and IFRS data, which makes it difficult to interpret 
their results regarding the impact on accounting quality as the international accounting 
standards go through changes over time.  In addition, the fact that Bartov et al. (2005) 
exclude loss-firm observations and obtain a result different from Hung and Subramanyam 
(2005) suggests that certain characteristics of the companies reporting under international 
accounting standards may drive the results.  This notion is supported by the findings of 
both Jermakowicz et al. (2007) and Christensen et al. (2007). Jermakowicz et al. (2007) 
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results suggests that the value relevance of earnings increases after companies adopt 
IFRS or US GAAP, a notion that make sense considering the sample used in the study 
(DAX-30 companies), a set of companies that are most likely to be able to cope with the 
complexity of implementing these GAAPs. They also find that, in spite of these 
companies’ ability to cope with an adoption to a more complex GAAP, they still find the 
adoption of IFRS to be a major challenge due to its complexity, high cost, and the lack of 
implementation guidance. Christensen et al.’s (2007) results suggests that companies that 
have an incentive to implement a more challenging GAAP are more likely to maintain a 
higher accounting quality (proxied as earnings management and timely loss recognition) 
compared to those who do not.  
We assume that the recent developments in the international accounting standards 
have led to changes in the quality of financial reporting over time.  Therefore, the 
question remains whether the accounting quality is higher as a result of the IASB’s 
initiatives and actions.  As the IASB reduces the allowable alternative accounting 
methods and choices and provides a more consistent approach to accounting 
measurement for the goal of developing a single set of high quality international 
accounting standards, we predict that these changes in recent years improve the quality of 
accounting as evidenced by higher value relevance of earnings and book value of equity, 
less earnings smoothing, and more timely recognition of losses.   
With respect to value relevance, we expect to see higher association between 
stock prices and earnings and book value of equity for firms with higher quality of 
reported accounting numbers.  Moreover, we expect that firms with less earnings 
smoothing will exhibit more variability in change in net income, a higher ratio of the 
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variability of change in net income to variability of change in cash flow, a less negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows and less frequency of reporting small 
positive earnings as the accounting quality improves.  With respect to timely loss 
recognition, we predict that firms with higher accounting quality show a larger frequency 
of large losses.   
III. Research Design 
We follow Barth et al. (2008) and Lang et al. 2005) when testing our predictions 
of higher quality of accounting as the IASB revises IAS and issues new IFRS in the 
recent years, we divide our study period (2000-2006) to three time periods: the IAS 
period ranging from 2000-2002; the IFRSvoluntary period ranging from 2003-2004 and the 
IFRSmandatory period ranging from 2005-2006.  Following prior research, we 
operationalize quality of accounting using earnings smoothing, timely recognition of 
losses measures, and value relevance. 
Four measures of earnings smoothing are used in this study.  They are the 
variability of the change in net income, the ratio of the variability of the change in net 
income to the variability of the change in operating cash flows, the correlation between 
accruals and cash flows and the frequency of small positive net income (Lang et al. 2005; 
Barth et al. 2006, 2008).  Our first earnings smoothing metric is the variability of the 
change in net income scaled by total assets, ∆NI (Barth et al. 2006, 2008; Lang et al. 
2006).  To control for other economic factors that affect earnings variability unrelated to 
the financial reporting system, we regress ∆NI on a number of control variables identified 
in prior literature (Ashbaugh 2001; Pagano et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Tarca 2004; 
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Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al., 2006, 2008), and the variances of the residuals of the 
regression is our measure of the earnings variability. The ∆NI is estimated as follows: 
.
1
1110987
6543210
itititititit
ititititititit
FFXLISTNUMEXAUDCFO
SizeTurnDissueEissueGrowthLEVNI
εβββββ
βββββββ
+++++
++++++=∆ + (1), 
where: 
LEV = the total liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity; 
GROWTH = the percentage of change in sales;  
Eissue = the percentage change in common shareholders’ equity; 
Dissue = the percentage change in total liabilities; 
Turn = sales divided by total assets; 
Size = the natural log of total assets; 
CFO = the cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
AUD= a dummy variable taking the value one if the firm’s auditor is PwC, KPMG, 
Arthur Andersen, E&Y, or D&T and zero otherwise; 
NUMEX = the number of stock exchanges on which a firm’s stock is listed; 
XLIST = a dummy variable taking the value one if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange (the U.S. not being the primary exchange) and zero otherwise. 
FF = the average number of shares traded the last day of the month during the fiscal year 
divided by number of common shares outstanding at the fiscal year end. 
We estimate equation (1) pooling observations in each of the three time periods examined 
and compare the variances of the residuals of the regression for each time period using a 
two-tailed variance ratio F-test.   
Our second measure of earnings smoothing is the ratio of the variability of the 
change in net income, ∆NI, to the variability of the change in operating cash flows, 
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∆CFO (Barth et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006).  ∆CFO is the change in cash flows scaled by 
total assets.  As with ∆NI, to control for other economic factors that affect cash flows 
variability unrelated to financial reporting system, we regress ∆CFO on a number of 
control variables similar to equation (1), but with ∆CFO as the dependent variable. 
.
1
1110987
6543210
itititititit
ititititititit
FFXLISTNUMEXAUDCFO
SizeTurnDissueEissueGrowthLEVCFO
εβββββ
βββββββ
+++++
++++++=∆ + (2), 
The variability of the change in cash flows is the variance of residuals from equation (2). 
Then the second measure of earnings smoothing is the ratio of the variability of ∆NI to 
the variability of ∆CFO.  The rationale for using this ratio is that it is plausible that the 
variability of net income is affected by the firm-specific volatility of cash flows and by 
using the ratio we control for this (Barth et al. 2006, 2008; Lang et al. 2006). We measure 
the difference between these ratios across time periods using ranksum test of the 
permuted dataset.  
The third measure of earnings smoothing is the spearman correlation between 
accruals and cash flows.  As with the previous tests, to control for economic factors 
unrelated to earnings smoothing, we run separate regressions of accruals and cash flows 
on the control variables as included in Equations 1 and 2, except CFO.  
.
1
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++++
++++++= + (4) 
We then compare and test the correlation of the residuals from equations (3) and (4) 
between the three time periods based on Cramer’s (1987) squared correlation test. 
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To test managing towards positive earnings, we run the following model 
including two periods (IAS vs. IFRSvoluntary and IFRSvoluntary vs. IFRSmandatory) at a time to 
examine if firms in one period are more likely to manage towards positive earnings 
(Barth et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006) than the other.  The coefficient on the small positive 
net income is our measure of managing towards positive earnings. 
.
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and 
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 (6) 
IAS(0,1) in the first estimation is equal to 1 for the IAS period and zero for the 
IFRSvoluntary period and in the second estimation, the IAS(0,1) is equal to 1 for the 
IFRSvoluntary  and zero for the IFRSmandatory period.  SPO is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01 (Barth et al., 2006; Lang et al., 
2006; Lang et al., 2003).  A positive coefficient on SPO in the estimation covering the 
IAS (IFRSvoluntary) period and the IFRSvoluntary (IFRSmandatory) period indicates that firms in 
the IAS (IFRSvoluntary) period manage earnings toward small positive amounts more 
frequently than firms in the IFRSvoluntary(IFRSmandatory) period. 
For the measure of timely recognition of losses, we also estimate an equation 
similar to equation (5) and (6), but replacing SPO with LNEG.   
.
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and 
.
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  (8) 
LNEG is a binary variable taking on the value of 1 for observations with annual earnings 
scaled by total assets less than negative 0.2, and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on 
LNEG is our measure of timely loss recognition.  A positive coefficient on LNEG 
indicates that firms in the IAS (IFRSvoluntary) period recognize large losses more 
frequently than those in IFRSvoluntary (IFRSmandatory). 
In addition, we also use Basu’s (1997) reverse regressions of earnings on a 
dummy variable for bad news (negative returns), annual return, and an interaction 
variable of return and the dummy variable for bad news. We expect that more timely loss 
recognition will result in a larger coefficient on bad news earnings. We compare the 
magnitude of the interaction coefficient across the three periods to evaluate the timeliness 
of bad news reflected in earnings. A larger coefficient indicates more timely loss 
recognition. 
The test of relative value relevance is based on a valuation framework provided 
by Ohlson (1995) where a firm’s share price is a function of both earnings and book 
value of equity.  
ititit BVEEP εβββ +++= 210        (9), 
where Pit is the market price per share three months after fiscal year end in year t of 
companyi, and Eit, and BVEit are earnings before extraordinary items, and book value of 
stockholders’ equity per share, respectively, and εit is the other value-relevant information 
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of company i in year t.  The regression model’s R2 indicates the strength of the 
association between the respective accounting variable(s) and stock price.   
We also use a reverse regression with earnings as the dependent variable and 
returns as the independent variable. We expect that if losses are recognized in a timely 
manner, the association between returns and earnings is stronger, mirroring that more 
information about earnings reaches the equity market on in the period the loss occurs and 
not later (Basu 1997). Hence, we predict an increase in the association between earnings 
and return over the three time periods under investigation. 
IV. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial sample consists of all industrial German listed companies found in the 
Datastream database in the years 2000 – 2002, 2003 – 2004 and 2005-2006, indicating 
IAS/IFRS as their primary accounting standards.5  German companies often are traded on 
more than one domestic stock exchange; we choose the common stock issue of the 
highest market value as the company’s primary stock issue, and use the stock price of that 
issue when a company has multiple issues of common stocks. For the value relevance 
test, the sample selection process yields a German IAS sample of 187 firm-year 
observations for 107 companies, a German IFRSvoluntary sample of 204 firm-year 
observations and companies, and a German IFRSmandatory sample of 448 firm-year 
observations and companies.  Table 2 outlines our sample selection procedures for the 
value relevance tests.  
In addition, to mitigate the effect of different firms in each period on the 
regression estimations, we match the sample firms in one period with the same firms in 
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 We include all firms where the applied accounting standards are either international accounting standards 
or IFRS.  
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the next period, and re-run all equations with the matched sample.  This procedure yields 
159 observations (92 companies) under the IAS period, 92 observations (92 companies) 
for the IFRSvoluntary period, and 90 observations (90 companies) under the IFRSmandatory 
period.  
<Table 2 about here> 
As shown in Table 3 below, the Electronic industry is the largest industry cluster 
in the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary  periods, and Financials is the largest in the IFRSmandatory 
period.  The Financials industry is the second largest industry during the IAS period, and 
the Financials and Machinery and Equipment firms are both the second largest industries 
during the IFRSvoluntary  period and Financials during the IFRSmandatory period.  One of the 
most notable change in industry specialization is an increase in number of Financial firms 
in the IFRSmandatory period.  It seems that most of the Financials firms were not using the 
IAS/IFRS until the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005.  Another change is the steady 
relative decrease of firms within the Recreation industry. 
<Table 3 about here> 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of earnings smoothing, timely loss 
recognition metrics, and value relevance, followed by the control variables.6 The earnings 
per share (EPS) increases significantly across the periods, which is plausible considering 
the economic upturn between 2003 and 2006. There is a significant increase in book 
value of shareholders’ equity per share (BVPS) between the IFRSvoluntary period and the 
IFRSmandatory period. The change in net income (∆NI) increases significantly from the IAS 
period to the IFRSvoluntary periods. The ∆NI then decreases between the IFRSvoluntary period 
and the IFRSmandatory period. There is no significant difference in change in cash flows 
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 Variables in all our analyzes are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to control for outliers. 
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from operations (∆CFO) between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods, while there is a 
significant decrease between the the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods. There is a 
significant increase in accruals (ACC), measured as net income minus cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets, between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods, 
which could possibly be related to a buildup of accruals caused by the abolishment of 
amortization of acquired goodwill. There is no significant difference in the prevalence of 
reporting of small positive earnings (SPOS) across the three periods. There is a 
significant decrease in the reporting of large negative earnings (Lneg) across the IAS and 
the IFRSvoluntary periods. This could be a sign of an increase in income smoothing 
behavior; however, this development could also be driven by the economic situation 
during the IAS period and the ongoing upturn during the two following period. The 
descriptive statistics on the control variables suggests that there is a decrease in growth 
between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods but an increase in growth between the 
IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods (measured as change in sales). The latter 
increase could be related to the new companies adopting IFRS in 2005. There is no 
statistically significant difference in change in common stock over the three periods. 
There is no significant difference in changes in total liabilities (Dissue) between the IAS 
and the IFRSvoluntary periods but there is significant increase between the IFRSvoluntary and 
the IFRSmandatory periods. The significant increase in the IFRSmandatory period could be 
driven by the fact that many more companies now must adopt IFRS and this result in the 
inclusion of companies that are less capital market oriented and more reliant on debt in 
the IFRSmandatory sample. However, it should be noted that there is no significant 
difference in leverage (measured as total liabilities to total shareholders’ equity) across 
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the three periods. There is a statistically significant increase in the asset turnover rate 
between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods. Although, this is development is reversed 
between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods. The latter is most likely a 
consequence of the inclusion of a large number of new IFRS adopters in the sample 
group. The size of the sample companies (measured as the natural log of total assets) 
decreases significantly between the IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary period. This could be 
driven by a lot of write downs during the IAS period due to the economic situation at that 
time, which is corroborated by the fact that in this period there was a significantly higher 
prevalence of reporting of large negative earnings. Finally, the cash flow from operations 
increased significantly between the IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary period, this may also 
be explained by the improved economic conditions in the following periods. However, 
the cash flow from operations decreased significantly between the IFRSvoluntary and the 
IFRSmandatory periods, which could be related to the inclusion of a large number of new 
IFRS adopters in the sample group. Finally, there is a significant decrease in the free float 
between the IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary period.  
<Table 4 about here> 
V. Results 
Earnings Smoothing  
As reported in Table 5, Panel A, the results of the tests of earnings smoothing are 
contrary to our expectations in some instances. The variability in the change in net 
income, ∆NI*, does increase significantly between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods, 
however, there is a significant decrease between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory 
periods, suggesting an increase in income smoothing behavior. We also control for the 
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firm-specific volatility in cash flow from operations by using the ratio of income 
variability and cash flow from operations variability. As predicted, the variability 
increases significantly between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods but decrease sharply 
and end up below the IAS level in the IFRSmandatory period, however, in this test the 
difference is statistically significant on the 5% level. Once again, this suggests an 
increase in income smoothing behavior. The correlation between the residuals from the 
regression on accruals (ACC) and cash flow from operations CFO shows an increase in 
the magnitude of the negative correlation indicating a significant increase in earnings 
management across the three periods. It should be noted that the correlation between 
ACC and CFO is positive in the IAS period. We interpret this as a sign that companies 
are growing and the growth is driving both an increase in CFO and a buildup of accruals. 
This notion is also confirmed by the measure of growth that was significantly larger in 
this period compared to the later two. Finally, there is no significant difference between 
the small positive income variable (SPOS) across the three periods. 
Timely Loss Recognition Tests 
Table 5, Panel B shows a significant decrease in the reporting of large negative 
earnings. As previously pointed out, the change in reporting of large negative earnings 
may be the result of an improvement of the economic conditions since the IAS period. 
However, most of our tests support the notion that the quality of accounting has 
decreased among German companies reporting under IAS and IFRS over time. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction variable of return and bad news shows a 
significant increase between the IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary period, as predicted. 
However, there is a significant decrease between the IFRSvoluntary period and the 
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IFRSmandatory period indicating less timely loss recognition. This also may have something 
to do with the number of new adopters in the IFRSmandatory period.  
Value Relevance Test 
We measure value relevance in terms of the ability of accounting measures to 
explain stock prices. As shown in Table 5, Panel C, the overall R2 of the regression 
models for each of the time period examined was 0.44 in the IAS period, 0.09 in the 
IFRSvoluntary period, and 0.19 in the IFRSmandatory period. Cramer’s (1987) test indicates a 
significant difference in R2 between all three periods. Contrary to our expectations, the 
R2s of both the IFRS periods are lower than the R2 of the IAS period, indicating a lower 
usefulness of financial reporting under IFRS compared to IAS.  
We also measure the R2 of a reverse regression where earnings is dependent 
variable and returns as the independent variable (Basu 1997). As predicted, there seem to 
be an increase in the association between earnings and returns between the IAS and the 
IFRSvoluntary periods (from 0.19 to 0.28). However, this development is once again 
reversed between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods (from 0.28 to 0.16). 
However, only the increase between the the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods is 
statistically significant. Turning to the bad news observations only, once again, we find 
an expected increase in the association between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary period. 
However, contrary to expectations, this turns into a significant decrease from 0.35 to 0.11 
between the IFRSvoluntary period and the IFRSmandatory period.  
<Table 5 about here> 
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In summary, our tests show consistent evidence that the quality of accounting 
increased between the IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary but that this development reverses 
between the IFRSvoluntary period and the IFRSmandatory period. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Our findings in the main analysis may be a result of a structural change in the type 
of companies that report under IFRS since it became mandatory for most public 
companies in Germany. When IFRS was a choice, certain types of firms may have had 
more incentives to opt to report under IFRS than others. Germany has a large and liquid 
capital market, which means that large and well established companies have relatively 
less incentive to switch to IAS/IFRS to attract foreign investors since they can raise 
capital reporting under German GAAP. However, small information technology and less 
well established companies may not have the same access to the German capital market, 
and therefore, have reasons to switch to IAS/IFRS to be able to raise capital. Also, as 
shown in Table 4, the distribution of companies in different industries changed between 
the IFRSvoluntary periods when the Electronics industry dominated and the IFRSmandatory 
period when the financial sector became dominating.  
In order to examine whether a self-selection bias in our pre-2005 sample drives 
the results we also rerun all tests using a sub-sample consisting of companies with firm-
year observations in both the IAS and the IFRS period. This sample has 159 observations 
(92 companies) for the IAS period and 92 observations (92 companies) for the 
IFRSvoluntary period and 90 observations (90 companies) for the IFRSmandatory period.  
As shown in Table 6 Panel A, the results for tests of earnings smoothing and 
timely loss recognition to some extent support the findings in the analysis using the 
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whole sample, although the reduction in accounting quality seems to be considerably 
lesser. The variability in the change in net income, ∆NI*, increases significantly between 
the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods but, as in the case with the whole sample, decreases 
significantly compared to the IFRSmandatory period.  When controlling for the volatility in 
cash flow from operating activities, by using the ratio of net income variability and cash 
flow from operations variability, we find the same pattern, a significant increase between 
the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods followed by a significant between the IFRSvoluntary 
and the IFRSmandatory periods. The correlation between accruals and cash flow from 
operations shows a significant decrease between the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary periods. 
The correlation is positive in both of these periods, although it becomes negative in the 
IFRSmandatory , however, the change is not statistically significant.  We find no significant 
difference in the frequency of reporting small positive earnings across the two periods. 
Finally, as shown in Table 6 Panel B, we find no significant change in reporting of large 
negative earnings, indicative for less timely loss recognition. However, contrary to the 
previous measure, the coefficient of the interaction variable of annual return and negative 
return is significantly larger for the IFRSvoluntary period compared to the IAS period. There 
is no significant difference between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 6 Panel C, the value relevance measures are also 
contradicting. The overall R2 of the regression models for time periods examined was 
0.47 in the IAS period and 0.15 in the IFRSvoluntary period. Cramer’s (1987) test indicates 
a significant difference in R2 between the two periods on the 1% level. This is partially 
reversed between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods (from 0.15 to 0.38, 
significant on the 5% level). The analysis of the earnings on returns regressions shows a 
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significant increase between IAS period and the IFRSvoluntary periods and a decrease 
between the IFRSvoluntary and the IFRSmandatory periods (though this is not significant). 
When we analyze the earnings on returns regressions using bad news observations only 
we find an incremental increase in the value relevance across all three periods.  
<Table 6 about here> 
We conclude that our measures of earnings management, timely loss recognition, 
and value relevance using a matched sample are neither providing evidence of an 
increase nor a decrease in accounting quality between the IAS and the IFRS period. 
At the time of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, there is a shift in the structure of 
the sample, the largest industry group was Electronics up to the end of 2004 after the 
mandatory adoption in 2005 the largest industry group is now the Financial. We, 
therefore, rerun our tests excluding financial observations in order to investigate whether 
the results of our main analysis is driven by companies in the financial sector. As shown 
in Table 7, there is no qualitative difference in our results from these tests compared to 
the main analysis using the full sample.  
<Table 7 about here> 
In order to analyze whether our results are driven by the new adopters in 2005, we 
also split the sample used in the IFRSmandatory period into a mandatory and a voluntary 
adopter group. Where the mandatory adopters are those who waited to adopt IFRS until it 
was made mandatory in 2005 and those who adopted IFRS before are classified as 
voluntary adopters. In addition, when doing this we also excluded all adopters of U.S. 
GAAP who waited to adopt IFRS until it was made mandatory. The reason for this is that 
we do not consider these companies as resisting the use of international accounting 
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standards, and therefore, they are different from those companies who resist switching 
from German GAAP to IFRS. As shown in Table 8, we find that there is slightly less 
variability in residuals of change of net income and the variability of the ratio of the 
variability of change in residuals of net income and cash flow from operations; however, 
the differences are not statistically significant. There seem to be more large negative 
earnings reported by the voluntary adopters but once again, the difference is not 
statistically significant. The only significant difference between the two groups is found 
in the value relevance tests, the resisters are consistently showing significantly lower 
value relevance in all such tests.  
<Table 8 about here> 
In order to establish that the any decrease in the quality of financial reporting is 
driven by the excluded set of U.S, GAAP adopters; we also compared these observations 
to the voluntary adopters. As expected, we did not find any evidence of this. On the 
contrary, the U.S. GAAP adopters show a significantly higher variability in change in 
residuals of net income (also when controlling for variability in change in residuals of 
cash flow from operations), a positive correlation between accruals and cash flow, a 
significantly lower frequency in reporting small positive incomes. However, the value 
relevance among these companies was lower than that of the voluntary adopters.  
<Table 9 about here> 
VI. Conclusion 
This study compares the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of 
German companies reporting under IAS during 2000-2002, and IFRS during 2003-2004 
and 2005-2006.  Specifically, we investigate whether there is a change in accounting 
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quality during these three time periods as IASB revises existing IAS and issues new IFRS 
to formulate a set of high quality international accounting standards for global financial 
reporting purpose.  Following prior research, we operationalize accounting quality with 
earnings smoothing, timely loss recognition, and value relevance metrics.  Contrary to 
our expectations, our results suggest a decrease in accounting quality over the last years. 
We find that earnings and book value of equity are becoming less value relevant during 
the IFRSmandatory period compared to both the IAS and the IFRSvoluntary period. The 
findings on earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition corroborate largely our 
findings with respect to the value relevance of accounting information. Our results 
consistently indicate that accounting quality has worsened over time. When using a 
matched sample we cannot find any clear indication of either an improved or a worsened 
quality of financial reporting. Further analysis of the 2005 to 2006 period provides some 
weak indications that this might have been partly driven by new adopters of IFRS in 
2005, however, only the difference in value relevance is statistically significant. We also 
investigated whether our results were driven by a new dominating industry group, 
Financials. We find nothing suggesting that this is the case. In sum, it seems that the 
decrease in accounting quality is mainly driven by changes in accounting standards, not 
the new adopters in 2005. The implication of this is that the last revisions of IASs and the 
addition of new IFRSs have caused a decrease the quality of financial reporting in 
Germany and future research needs to establish which standards drive this development.  
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Table 1: Summary of Revisions of IAS and IFRS over Time 
Panel A: Revisions During the IAS period 
 
Standard 
 
Issued/
revised 
Year 
 
In effect 
 
Focus  
 
Revision Made 
IAS 12 2000 2001 Income 
Taxes 
The standard was amended to include guidance on 
accounting for tax consequences of dividends and 
other distributions made by the reporting parent 
company. 
IAS 19 2000 2001 Employee 
benefits 
Revised to include and regulate more the 
retirement benefit costs only. 
IAS 40 2000 2001 Investment 
property  
Was an attempt to impose fair value measurement 
of investment property, ended up allowing it as an 
alternative to historical cost accounting. 
Panel B: Revisions During the IFRS voluntary period 
 
Standard 
 
Issued/
revised 
Year 
 
In effect 
 
Focus  
 
Revision Made 
IAS 10  2003 2004 Events after 
the reporting 
period 
Regulates the reporting of events after the 
reporting period. 
IAS 17 2003 2004 Leases Initial direct and incremental costs by lessors in 
negotiating leases must be recognized over the 
lease term.  
IAS 32 2003 2005* Presentation 
of financial 
instruments 
Additional guidance on measurement of the 
components of compound instruments on initial 
recognition and to group all guidance on financial 
instruments in one standard 
IAS 33 2003 2005* Earnings per 
share 
Clarifying the standard and eliminate alternatives 
allowed by the standard. 
IAS 41 2001 2003 Agriculture Regulates accounting for agricultural assets. These 
types of assets were previously not covered by 
other IASs. 
IAS 36 2004 2004 Impairment 
of assets 
Requires measurement of recoverable amount of 
intangible assets with an indefinite useful life on an 
annual basis (including goodwill and intangible 
assets not yet available for use).  
IAS 38 2004 2004 Intangible 
assets 
The assumption that all assets’ useful life is finite 
is abolished. In addition, intangible assets with 
infinite useful life should not be amortized.  
IFRS 1 2003 2004 First-time 
adoption of 
IFRS 
Sets out the procedures for first-time Adoption.  
IFRS 3 2004 2004 Business 
combinations 
Prohibits the use of the pooling of interests method 
for business combinations. Goodwill is initially 
defined as the net fair value of acquired assets and 
liabilities. Goodwill etc. with infinite lives are mot 
amortized. Also see IAS 36 and IAS 38. 
IAS 1 2003 2005* Presentation 
of Financial 
Statements 
Mostly transferring the policies application related 
to changes in accounting estimates and errors to 
IAS 8 while the presentation issues is transferred to 
IAS 1.  
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Panel B: Revisions During the IFRS voluntary period cont. 
 
Standard 
 
Issued/
revised 
Year 
 
In effect 
 
Focus  
 
Revision Made 
IAS 2 2003 2005* Inventories The main change is the prohibition of LIFO as a 
cost formula. 
IAS 8 2003 2005* Accounting 
policies, 
changes in 
accounting 
estimates and 
errors 
Please refer to revisions described for IAS 1. 
IAS 16 2004 2005* Property, 
plant, and 
equipment 
Costs of dismantlement, removal or restoration are 
included in capitalized amounts.  
 
Fair value revaluation only if this is reliably 
measurable. 
 
Depreciation must start when the asset is available 
for use and continues regardless if the asset is idle 
or not. 
IAS 19 2004 2006* Employee 
benefits 
Revised to permit recognition of actuarial gain and 
losses in equity and to require additional 
disclosure. 
IAS 21 2003 2005* Changes in 
foreign 
exchange 
rates 
Removal of a limited option to capitalize exchange 
rate differences resulting from severe devaluation 
or depreciation of a currency against which there is 
no means of hedging. 
IAS 24 2003 2005* Related party 
disclosures 
Requires disclosure of compensation to key 
management employees and expands the definition 
of “related party” by adding joint ventures, etc. 
IAS 27 2003 2005* Consolidated 
and separate 
financial 
statements 
Minority interests are now presented within the 
equity as a separate line item. 
IAS 28 2003 2005* Investments 
in associates 
Investors must not only consider the carrying 
amount the investment but also other long-term 
interests in the associate when recognizing its share 
of losses of the associate. 
IAS 31 2003 2005* Interests in 
joint 
ventures 
Investors must disclose the method used to 
recognize its interest in jointly controlled entities 
(proportional consolidation or the equity method). 
IAS 39 2004 2005* Financial 
instruments: 
recognition 
and 
measurement 
Added fair value accounting for a hedge of the 
interest rate exposure of a portfolio of financial 
assets and liabilities. 
IAS 40  2004 2005* Investment 
property 
Defining the concept “investment property” and 
impose a consistent use of the fair value or the cost 
model. 
IFRS 2 2004 2005* Share-based 
payment 
Require recognition of all share-based payment 
transactions using a fair value measurement basis. 
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Panel B: Revisions During the IFRS voluntary period cont. 
 
Standard 
 
Issued/
revised 
Year 
 
In effect 
 
Focus  
 
Revision Made 
IFRS 4 2004 2005* Insurance 
contracts 
Prohibits catastrophe and equalization reserves. 
Requires testing of the adequacy of recognized 
insurance liabilities and impairment tests of 
reinsurance assets.  
IFRS 5 2004 2005* Non-current 
assets held 
for sale and 
discontinued 
operations 
Prescribes accounting for assets held for sale and 
the presentation and disclosure of discontinued 
operations. 
Panel C: Revisions During the IFRS mandatory period 
 
Standard 
 
Issued/
revised 
Year 
 
In effect 
 
Focus  
 
Revision Made 
IAS 39 2005 2006 Financial 
instruments: 
recognition 
and 
measurement 
Restricted the use of the “fair value option” to 
eliminate accounting or economic mismatches. 
IFRS 6 2005 2006 Exploration 
for and 
evaluation of 
mineral 
resources 
Regulates the financial reporting of mineral 
resources until IASB has completed a 
comprehensive project of this. 
IFRS 7 2006 2007 Financial 
instruments 
disclosure 
Require disclosure of information on the 
significance of financial instruments for a 
company’s financial position and profitability. 
IFRS 8 2006 2009* Operating 
Segments 
Extends and change the scope of segment 
reporting. 
* Earlier application is encouraged. 
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Table 2: Sample Selection Process. 
 
IAS IFRSVOLUNTARY IFRSMANDATORY 
  
Firms 
Firm-
Years 
 
Firms 
Firm-
Years 
 
Firms 
Firm-
Years 
 
From Datastream 
 
290 
 
570 
 
327 
 
327 
 
571 
 
571 
Excluded observations 
due to missing data 
 
-183 
 
-383 
 
-123 
 
-123 
 
-123 
 
-123 
Total sample 107 187 204 204 448 448 
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Table 3: Analysis of Industry Specialization 
 IAS IFRSVOLUNTARY IFRSMANDATORY 
Aerospace 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 
Apparel 3 2% 4 2% 7 2% 
Automotive 4 3% 4 2% 6 1% 
Beverages 0 0% 1 0% 6 1% 
Chemicals 4 4% 5 2% 12 3% 
Construction 4 4% 9 4% 20 4% 
Diversified 2 2% 2 1% 6 1% 
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 5 5% 10 5% 21 5% 
Electrical 3 3% 5 2% 11 2% 
Electronics 14 13% 31 15% 55 12% 
Financials 12 11% 22 11% 65 15% 
Food 1 1% 1 0% 6 1% 
Machinery and equipment 10 9% 23 11% 44 10% 
Metal producers 1 1% 1 0% 1 0% 
Metal product manufacturers 1 1% 3 1% 5 1% 
Oil, gas, coal and related services 0 0% 2 1% 2 0% 
Paper 0 0% 2 1% 5 1% 
Printing and publishing 0 0% 2 1% 3 1% 
Recreation 6 6% 10 5% 16 4% 
Retailers 2 2% 7 3% 13 3% 
Textiles 2 2% 2 1% 4 1% 
Transportation 2 2% 2 1% 3 1% 
Utilities 4 4% 6 3% 14 3% 
Miscellaneous 27 25% 50 25% 122 27% 
 107  204  451  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  
 IAS Firms N=187 IFRSV Firms N=204 IFRSM Firms N=448 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Test Variables          
EPS1   -0.162    0.022            0.444  -0.034***   0.052***            0.300   0.019**   0.058**            0.226 
BVPS2    0.818    0.583            0.699   0.737   0.670            0.511   0.642**   0.548***            0.481 
Return3 -36.298 -39.190          37.876 27.005***   7.715***          61.345 24.681 17.535***          49.371 
∆NI4   -0.054   -0.005            0.202   0.255***   0.013***            0.223   0.011   0.007***            0.136 
∆CFO5    0.019    0.010            0.121   0.017   0.009            0.124 -0.006**  -0.003***            0.110 
ACC6   -0.108   -0.051            0.197  -0.089  -0.060            0.190 -0.020***  -0.017***            0.124 
SPOS7    0.123    0.000            0.329   0.118   0.000            0.323   0.107   0.000            0.310 
Lneg8    0.150    0.000            0.358   0.083**   0.000**            0.277   0.051   0.000            0.221 
Control Variables         
LEV9    0.579    0.614            0.252   0.578   0.608            0.263   0.557   0.575            0.246 
Growth10    0.294    0.056            0.714   0.092***   0.047*            0.350   0.184**   0.090***            0.508 
Eissue11    0.053    0.000            0.227   0.082   0.000            0.266   0.119   0.000            0.420 
Dissue12    0.421    0.037            1.682   0.275   0.012            1.503   0.333   0.059***            1.585 
Turn13    1.093    0.929            0.829   1.191   1.118**            0.778   1.061   1.012**            0.716 
Size14 13.354 12.384            2.721 12.467*** 11.758***            2.634 12.479 12.053            2.358 
CFO15    0.044    0.057            0.117   0.074**   0.075***            0.123   0.046   0.055***            0.104 
NUMEX16    2.337    2.000            1.668   2.098   2.000            1.365   1.920   2.000*            1.211 
AUD17    0.658    1.000            0.476   0.598   1.000            0.492   0.596   1.000            0.491 
XLIST18    0.016    0.000            0.126   0.010   0.000            0.098   0.009   0.000            0.094 
FF19 91.584 15.846 165,240.000 60.201** 10.541** 134,479.500 46.717 11.719 111,953.000 
1 EPS is earnings per share at year end of the fiscal year deflated by the share price 6 months after the preceding fiscal year end. 
2 BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share at the end of the fiscal year deflated by the share price 6 months after the preceding fiscal year end. 
3
 Return is the annual return of company i at time t. 
4 
∆NI is the change in annual earnings scaled by total assets. 
5
 ∆CF is the change in cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets. 
6 ACC is earnings less cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets. 
7
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
8
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
9
 LEV is total liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity. 
10
 Growth is the percentage change in sales. 
11
 Eissue is the percentage change in common shareholders’ stock. 
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12 Dissue is the percentage change in total liabilities. 
13
 Turn is sales divided by total assets. 
14
 Size is the natural log of total assets. 
15CFO is the cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets. 
16
 NUMEX is the number of stock exchange listings. 
17
 AUD is an indicator taking on the value of 1 if the firm’s auditor is PwC, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, E&Y, or D&T, and 0 otherwise. 
18
 XLIST is an indicator taking on the value of 1 if the firm is listed on any U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. 
19
 FF is the free float measured as the average number of shares traded the last day of the month during the fiscal year divided by number of common shares 
outstanding at the fiscal year end, divided by 1,000. 
Asterisks indicate that there is significantly different from the previous time period using a two-tailed t-test: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Analysis of Accounting Quality  
Panel A: Earnings 
Management 
IAS 
N=187 
 IFRSV 
 
N=204 
 IFRSM 
N=448 
 
 
      
Variability of ∆NI*1 0.038    0.048***    0.018***  
Variability of ∆NI* over 
∆CFO*2,3 
 
3.950 
  
  4.697** 
  
  1.840** 
 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO*4 0.083  -0.048**  -0.049  
Small positive NI5  -0.273  0.125    
Panel B: Timely Loss 
Recognition 
      
 
Large negative NI6 
  
0.715### 
  
0.565## 
  
Basu Regression of Return * 
Dum Coefficient7 
 
0.003### 
  
  0.008***### 
  
0.004***### 
 
Panel C: Association of Stock 
Prices and Returns with 
Accounting Data4 
      
       
Price8 0.442  0.088***  0.191**  
Return regression9: 
Pooling good news and bad news 
observations 
 
 
0.194 
  
 
0.283* 
  
 
0.155 
 
Basu Good News 0.026  0.022  0.013  
Basu Bad News 0.129  0.345**  0.109**  
 
*, **, *** Significantly different between each category at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
#
, 
##
, 
###
 Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
1
 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
2
 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
3
 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 
4
 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC 
and CFO regression. 
5
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
6
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
7
 The regression is εββββ ++++= DUMRDUMREPS *3210 where EPS is annual earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if 
the return is negative and 0 otherwise.  
8 The regression is εβββ +++= BVPSEPSP 210 where P is price as of three months after the fiscal year –
end, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share. All variables 
are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 
9
 The Basu good and bad news regression is εββ ++= REPS 10 , where EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for 
which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
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Table 6: Analysis of Accounting Quality Using a Sub-Sample of voluntary IFRS adopters. 
Panel A: Earnings 
Management 
IAS 
N=159 
 IFRSV 
 
N=92 
 IFRSM  
N=90 
 
 
      
Variability of ∆NI*1  0.037  0.053**    0.014***  
Variability of ∆NI* over 
∆CFO*2,3 
 
 4.125 
  
8.152*** 
  
  1.924* 
 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO*4  0.292  0.063***  -0.120  
Small positive NI5  -0.075  0.120   
Panel B: Timely Loss 
Recognition 
      
 
Large negative NI6 
  
 0.259 
  
0.633 
  
Basu Regression of Return * 
Dum Coefficient7 
 
 0.003## 
  
0.009###** 
  
  0.008### 
 
Panel C: Association of Stock 
Prices and Returns with 
Accounting Data4 
      
       
Price8  0.473  0.149***  0.376**  
Return regression9: 
Pooling good news and bad news 
observations 
 
 
 0.187 
  
 
0.391** 
  
 
0.252 
 
Basu Good News -0.030  0.157**  0.013  
Basu Bad News  0.124  0.347*  0.452  
 
*, **, *** Significantly different between each category at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
#
, 
##
, 
###
 Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
1
 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
2
 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
3
 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 
4
 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC 
and CFO regression. 
5
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
6
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
7
 The regression is εββββ ++++= DUMRDUMREPS *3210 where EPS is annual earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if 
the return is negative and 0 otherwise.  
8 The regression is εβββ +++= BVPSEPSP 210 where P is price as of three months after the fiscal year –
end, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share. All variables 
are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 
9
 The Basu good and bad news regression is εββ ++= REPS 10 , where EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for 
which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
 
 38
Table 7: Analysis of Accounting Quality Excluding Firm-Year Observations from the Financial Industry 
Panel A: Earnings 
Management 
IAS 
N=196 
 IFRSV  
N=194 
 IFRSM 
N=386 
 
 
      
Variability of ∆NI*1 0.042  0.053    0.018***  
Variability of ∆NI* over 
∆CFO*2,3 
 
4.074 
  
4.989* 
  
  1.814*** 
 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO*4 0.049  0.002**  -0.031***  
Small positive NI5  -0.080  0.089   
Timely Loss Recognition       
 
Large negative NI6 
  
  0.738### 
  
0.620### 
  
Basu Regression of Return * 
Dum Coefficient3 
 
0.003## 
  
0.009###*** 
  
  0.001#*** 
 
Association of Stock Prices and 
Returns with Accounting Data4 
      
       
Price 0.435  0.084***    0.196**  
Return regression: 
Pooling good news and bad news 
observations 
 
 
0.186 
  
 
0.124 
  
 
0.096 
 
Basu Good News 0.020  0.006  0.012  
Basu Bad News 0.128  0.343**  0.133**  
 
*, **, *** Significantly different between each category at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
#
, 
##
, 
###
 Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
1
 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
2
 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
3
 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 
4
 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC 
and CFO regression. 
5
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
6
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
7
 The regression is εββββ ++++= DUMRDUMREPS *3210 where EPS is annual earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if 
the return is negative and 0 otherwise.  
8 The regression is εβββ +++= BVPSEPSP 210 where P is price as of three months after the fiscal year –
end, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share. All variables 
are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 
9
 The Basu good and bad news regression is εββ ++= REPS 10 , where EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for 
which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
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Table 8: Analysis of Accounting Quality Using Observations from the 2005-2006 Period, Comparing 
Voluntary Adopters of IFRS and Mandatory Adopters of IFRS. 
Panel A: Earnings 
Management 
  IFRSV  
N=224 
 IFRSM 
N=137 
 
 
      
Variability of ∆NI*1     0.014    0.013  
Variability of ∆NI* over 
∆CFO*2,3 
   
  1.626 
  
  1.619 
 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO*4   -0.245    0.049  
Small positive NI5    -0.307   
Timely Loss Recognition       
 
Large negative NI6 
    
  0.432 
  
Basu Regression of Return * 
Dum Coefficient3 
   
  0.005### 
 
 
 
-0.001 
 
Association of Stock Prices and 
Returns with Accounting Data4 
      
       
Price     0.402    0.007***  
Return regression: 
Pooling good news and bad news 
observations 
   
  0.058 
  
0.100 
 
Basu Good News   -0.005    0.100*  
Basu Bad News     0.361  -0.029***  
 
*, **, *** Significantly different between each category at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
#
, 
##
, 
###
 Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
1
 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
2
 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
3
 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 
4
 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC 
and CFO regression. 
5
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
6
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
7
 The regression is εββββ ++++= DUMRDUMREPS *3210 where EPS is annual earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if 
the return is negative and 0 otherwise.  
8 The regression is εβββ +++= BVPSEPSP 210 where P is price as of three months after the fiscal year –
end, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share. All variables 
are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 
9
 The Basu good and bad news regression is εββ ++= REPS 10 , where EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for 
which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
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Table 9: Analysis of Accounting Quality Using Observations from the 2005-2006 Period, Comparing 
Voluntary Adopters of IFRS and Adopters of IFRS Who Previously Reported Under US GAAP. 
Panel A: Earnings 
Management 
  IFRSV  
N=224 
 Pre-US 
GAAP
 
N=87 
 
 
      
Variability of ∆NI*1     0.014    0.035***  
Variability of ∆NI* over 
∆CFO*2,3 
   
  1.626 
  
  2.318*** 
 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO*4   -0.245    0.143  
Small positive NI5    -1.782#   
Timely Loss Recognition       
 
Large negative NI6 
    
  0.265 
  
Basu Regression of Return * 
Dum Coefficient3 
   
  0.005### 
  
  0.006##*** 
 
Association of Stock Prices and 
Returns with Accounting Data4 
      
       
Price     0.402    0.230**  
Return regression: 
Pooling good news and bad news 
observations 
   
  0.058 
  
  0.139 
 
Basu Good News   -0.005  -0.013  
Basu Bad News     0.361    0.064**  
 
*, **, *** Significantly different between each category at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
#
, 
##
, 
###
 Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 
1
 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
2
 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 
3
 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 
4
 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC 
and CFO regression. 
5
 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
6
 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by 
total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 
7
 The regression is εββββ ++++= DUMRDUMREPS *3210 where EPS is annual earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if 
the return is negative and 0 otherwise.  
8 The regression is εβββ +++= BVPSEPSP 210 where P is price as of three months after the fiscal year –
end, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders’ equity per share. All variables 
are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 
9
 The Basu good and bad news regression is εββ ++= REPS 10 , where EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for 
which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
